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When the Department of Defense advances money to a contractor in
the form of progress payments,1 it secures the loan by taking title to
most of the contractor's personalty associated with the contract. If the
contractor thereafter becomes insolvent, the Defense Department may
reclaim this property, setting off the contractor's debts against its obli-
gation to pay for the property. To the extent that the value of the
property covers the contractor's indebtedness, this setoff enables the
government to obtain payment in full before all other claims are
satisfied.
A secured party must normally file his security interest so that pros-
pective creditors will be notified that part of the debtor's property is
subject to a prior claim. Otherwise, state law2 and the federal Bank-
ruptcy Act3 will usually invalidate his interest, thereby reducing him
to the status of an unsecured creditor. When progress payments are
involved, however, the federal courts have allowed the Defense Depart-
ment to enforce its security interests4 without filing or other notifica-
1 "Progress payments" is the term used in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(hereinafter cited as ASPR), 32 C.F.R., pts. 1-59 (1966), to describe periodic advancements
of money to the contractor after the latter has commenced contract performance and
incurred costs. Essentially loans, the payments are subject to repayment in accordance
with terms contained in the contract. 32 C.F.R. § 163.79-1 (1966). To be distinguished from
progress payments are "advance payments," monies advanced before the contractor incurs
any costs, 32 C.F.R. § 163.64-2 (1966), and "partial payments," which represent final pay-
ments for partial deliveries accepted by the government. 82 C.F.R. § 168.78-1 (1966).
When granting progress payments, the Department of Defense considers both the size
of the contract and the financial ability of the contractor. Contracts in excess of one mil-
lion dollars that require substantial expenditures for at least six months before any prod-
ucts are completed customarily receive progress payments if the contractor is financially
sound. 82 C.F.R. § 163.72 (1966).
2 See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-301-08; see generally UNIFORM COMMERaC&L
CODE § 9, pt. 8.
By requiring filing of the security interest in a public place, such as the Office of the
Secretary of State, the statutes give creditors an opportunity to discover the presence of the
security interest if they so desire. Such opportunity is deemed to be equivalent to public
notification. See generally 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM CoMrErRCIAL CODE 461 (1963).
3 80 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)(1) (1964).
4 The Uniform Commercial Code's definition of a security interest as "an interest in
personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation .... "
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(37), encompasses the government's title. The latter
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tion to third parties,5 even though prospective creditors have no reli-
able way to determine whether the contractor's property is encumbered
by that agency.
In resolving contests between the Department and private parties
for the senior claim to the collateral covered by the progress payments
clause, the federal courts have applied federal common law, referred
to the Constitution, and searched for the location of "title." Their
analysis has disregarded the fact that the title is essentially a security
interest. After describing the contractual provisions and judicial doc-
trines that permit the Department to obtain priority over many
competing parties, this comment will suggest that the government
should file its security interest 6 and will propose several methods by
which such a requirement might be effected. The "first in time, first in
right" rule that the courts have adopted to resolve priority struggles will
also be compared with the Uniform Commercial Code's priority system.
Finally, it will be suggested that, drawing from the Code, courts might
modify that statute's rules and determine priority questions on the basis
of four policy considerations that seem to make more meaningful dis-
tinctions among security interests than do the courts' federal common
law and "title" analyses.
I
Under the standard Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(ASPR),7 the progress payments clauses provides the contractor with
both secures payment of the contractor's liabilities and facilitates rapid contract perform-
ance. See generally Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does Not Do for the Future, 26 LA. L. REv.
300, 302-04 (1966).
5 In United States v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452 (1910), the Court
established the special treatment accorded the Department by holding that if a contract
passed title to specific property to the government, private liens in that property could
not be enforced. Since World War II, the following federal cases expanded and modified
the Ansonia principle: United States v. Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40 (1959); Shepard Engineering
Co. v. United States, 287 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1961), af'd on rehearing, 289 F.2d 681 (8th
Cir. 1961); In re American Boiler Works, Inc., 220 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1955); In re Green-
street, 209 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1954); In re Read-York, Inc., 152 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1945);
United States v. Ameco Electronic Corp., 224 F. Supp. 783 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Thomson
Machine Works Co. v. Lake Tahoe Marine Supply Co., 135 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
6 Although this comment is specifically aimed at the security interest created by the
progress payments clause, the arguments in favor of creditor notification apply with
equal force to all secret security interests that are enforceable. In particular, paramount
liens that secure repayment of Defense Department "advance payments" should probably
also be filed even though the encumbered property is segregated and identified as subject
to a paramount lien. See 32 C.F.R. § 163.64-2 (1966).
7 These regulations specify the clauses that government contracting officers may insert
in contracts. The statutory authority for the progress payments clause is the Armed
Services Procurement Act of 1947, 62 Stat. 21, 10 U.S.C. § 2307 (1964), that authorizes
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financing for the contract. 9 The government agrees to reimburse him
periodically for up to seventy per cent of all costs that have been in-
curred in connection with the contract.' 0 In return, the contractor
agrees that title to all his materials, supplies, and nondurable tools
associated with the contract shall vest in the Defense Department when
the contract is signed."' Title to all such items later acquired, including
progress payments "if secured by adequate security." Although the act states that the
security may be in the form of a lien on the property that is paramount to all other
liens, neither it nor the legislative history further specify the definition of "adequate
security." The legislative history of the act does not suggest hostility to mandatory filing
of the Department's security interest. See 93 CONG. REc. 2318-28 (1946).
Substantially the same title passing provisions are recommended by the Administrator
of General Services for all federal government procurement contracts. See 41 C.F.R.
§§ 1-30.503, 1-81701, 1-81707 (1966). The various agencies are free, within limitations, to
modify or supplement these clauses as they see fit. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. pts. 5-7 (1966).
Many of the ASPR clauses are mandatory in certain types of contracts; for example, if
progress payments are provided, one of two standard clauses must be inserted. If the
contracting officer neglected to insert a required clause in the completed contract, how-
ever, it would seem that the parties would be bound only by the written instrument. To
the contrary, the Court of Claims recently held that an omitted termination for the con-
venience of the government clause that was required by the ASPR would be read into the
contract after the government's default. G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312
F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Comment, Defense Contractor's Peril: The Written Agreement
May Not Contain All the Terms, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 452 (1964). The holding seems to
imply that a contract providing for progress payments would have the title passing pro-
vision read into it if it were omitted. Such a development might jeopardize secured
creditors' interests in the contractor's property even more than the existing arrangement.
8 32 C.F.R. § 163.79-1 (1966). The progress payments, default, and termination for
convenience clauses that are discussed in this comment are the ones required for fixed-
price supply contracts. However, other Defense contracts, such as those for research and
development and those that pay the contractor according to a cost-reimbursement prin-
ciple, contain similar clauses. See 32 C.F.R. pt. 7 (1966).
9 Contractors prefer progress payment financing to borrowing from commercial sources
since the government's advances are interest free. The Department of Defense will
normally also favor such financing since, by reducing the contractor's capital cost, the
advances help reduce the contract price. See generally Vhelan, Government Supply
Contracts: Progress Payments Based on Costs: The New Defense Regulations, 26 FoRDkNI
L. REv. 224 (1957); McClelland, The Illegality of Progress Payments as Means of Financing
Government Contractors, 33 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 380 (1958).
10 32 C.F.R. § 163.79-1 (1966). Comparison with other provisions of the clause emphasize
that the government holds this title only as a security device. Bearing the risk of theft,
loss, or fire, id. § 163.79-1(e), the contractor may dispose of scrap and, with the contracting
officer's permission, may sell the property. Id. § 163.79-1(d). Further, the Department may
still reject the product at the time of final inspection. Id. § 163.79-1(i). Moreover, the
elaborate regulations that contractors possessing government furnished property must heed
do not apply to this property. Id. § 163.79-1(d).
Alternatively, the government sometimes provides up to 85% of direct labor and
materials costs, excluding reimbursement for such items as factory overhead. 32 C.F.R.
§ 163.79-2 (1966).
11 Specifically, the contractor agrees that: "Immediately, upon the date of this contract,
title to all parts; materials; inventories; work in progress; special tooling ... ; nondurable
(i.e., noncapital) tools, jigs, dies ... theretofore acquired or produced by the Contractor
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both partially and fully completed products, shall vest in the govern-
ment upon acquisition by the contractor. 12
If the contractor becomes insolvent and defaults,'5 the Department of
Defense may file a reclamation petition14 and reclaim from the trustee
in bankruptcy all the property to which title has passed under the
contract.' 5 Although the contract provides that the contractor will
receive reasonable value for the property so reclaimed,16 the govern-
ment's payment is considerably reduced because it first deducts the
contractor's liabilities; specifically, it subtracts his obligations to repay
all progress payments17 and to pay for all costs in excess of the contract
price that are necessary in order to have someone else complete the
contract.' Thus, by holding title to the contractor's property, the
and allocated . . . to this contract . . . shall forthwith vest in the Government; and title
to all like property thereafter acquired or produced . . . shall forthwith vest in the
Government upon said acquisition...8." 32 C.F.R. § 168.79-1(d) (1966).
12 Although title vests in the government, the progress payments clause also provides
that if the contractor defaults, he may be required to execute an instrument of title
transfer. The purpose behind requiring such an instrument is unclear. Compare 32 C.F.R.
§ 163.79-1(d) (1966) with 32 C.F.R. § 8.707 (1966) and 32 C.F.R. § 163.94-4 (1966).
On the other hand, if the contractor fully performs his obligations, "any excess property
remaining is to be regarded as having not been allocated or properly chargeable to the
contract ... and thus outside the scope of the Progress Payment clause which would
have vested title in the Government." 32 C.F.R. § 163.94-5(b) (1966).
3 In those contracts that give the government the power to terminate at any time, the
Department of Defense might attempt to obtain the property prior to insolvency. If soon
thereafter the contractor became bankrupt, for example, if the contract termination
caused or anticipated his finandal problems, a bankruptcy trustee might attempt to
invalidate the government's priority under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 80 Stat. 562 (1898),
as amended, 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964). Section 60 normally invalidates the
preference that an unperfected secured creditor receives by being paid in full rather than
sharing in the bankruptcy dividends. While there are no cases in which this happened,
one would assume that, to be consistent, the courts would either exempt the Department
of Defense from this section of the Bankruptcy Act or would hold that the government's
interest is perfected and thus not vulnerable to § 60. See also note 74 infra.
14 After stating that he holds title to the property, the petitioner asks the trustee to
deliver possession. See generally Central States Corp. v. Luther, 215 F.2d 38 (10th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 951 (1955); In re Morley, 29 F. Supp. 979 (D.C. Pa. 1939), and
cases cited therein; 4 CoLmER, BANKRupTcY § 70.39 (14th ed. 1964).
15 Since the trustee normally holds title to all of the bankrupt's property, he may
usually resist the petition successfully if the secured party's interest is unperfected. See
30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964). When the
Department of Defense petitions, however, such trustee resistance has been futile, see, e.g.,
In re Read-York, Inc., 152 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1945), thus implying that the Defense
Department's title is considered perfected.
16 Compare 32 C.F.R. § 8.707(d) (1966) with 82 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1966).
17 32 C.F.R. § 163.79-1(b) (1966).
18 32 C.F.R. § 8.707(b) (1966). For example, in Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40
(1959), the Department of Defense attempted to set off a portion of its $146,000 claim for
such excess costs even though repayment of the progress payments was secure. See the
case on remand, 287 F.2d 577 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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government secures full payment of its claims to the extent that the
value of the property covers them.19
When the contractor is insolvent, this method of assuring payment
of the Defense Department's claims may have a substantial adverse
impact on creditors whose claims are thereby subordinated to those of
the government.20 The normal order in which a bankrupt's assets are
distributed to creditors was established by Congress in the Bankruptcy
Act. Secured creditors' claims are first paid in full to the extent of the
collateral. 21 Then the expenses of administration, materialmen's claims,
debts due the government, and unsecured obligations are satisfied in
that order,22 all claims in a given category being paid in full before any
claims in the succeeding group receive anything.
Avoiding the ordinary statutory priorities, the contract provisions
that vest title in the government convert the relevant property from
general assets of the contractor into collateral securing the contractor's
debts owed to the Defense Department. Thus, the agency's claims are
advanced from the fourth classification (debts due the government) to
the first (secured obligations). If the government's secured claims ex-
haust the debtor's assets, neither materialmen's claims2 nor the ex-
penses of administration will be satisfied. More significantly, if success-
ful in claiming specific property as collateral for its claims, the Defense
Department will displace any secured creditors who have perfected
security interests in that same property24 if their interests were
acquired after the signing of the contract.2 5 These creditors will have
only a security interest in the value of the property in excess of the
If the contractor's default results from forces beyond his control, however, he is not
liable for these excess costs. 82 C.F.R. § 8.707(d) (1966).
19 If the value of the reclaimed property exceeds the contractor's liabilities, the Depart-
ment of Defense will, of course, refund the excess. See 32 C.F.R. § 8.707(d) (1966).
20 Neither Defense Department publications nor inquiries from this author to that
agency have disclosed the number, size, or other characteristics of defense contractors that
become bankrupt. Perhaps the Department does not have such information readily
available.
21 30 Stat. 560 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 93(h) (1964).
22 30 Stat. 563 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1964).
23 E.g., Thomson Machine Works Co. v. Lake Tahoe Marine Supply Co., 185 F. Supp.
918 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
24 This possibility would seem to be the greatest threat to a contractor's creditors since
many contractors may require private financing in addition to the progress payments. The
cases, however, are predominately brought by materialmen with statutory mechanics liens.
E.g., United States v. Ameco Electronic Corp., 224 F. Supp. 783 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). The lack
of suits by secured creditors may result from settlements with the government or a sense
of hopelessness engendered by the existing case law.
25 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1959), established that secured parties'
interests are valid if acquired before the contract is signed, i.e., before the government
obtained title to the property.
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Department's claims, since private liens cannot attach to property to
which the federal government holds title.26 In most cases, the private
party would then have to present an unsecured claim in bankruptcy,
the government's claims having exhausted the collateral. Since un-
secured creditors in bankruptcy recover on an average only about eight
cents on the dollar as compared to sixty-six cents on the dollar for
secured parties,27 a lender would normally suffer a substantially larger
financial loss due to the government's unfiled title.
Since United States v. Ansonia Brass and Copper Co.,28 the federal
courts have consistently held that the government can reclaim property
under a contract that passes title without filing its interest.2 9 Despite
the Bankruptcy Act's provision ° specifying that state law shall govern
the validity of security interests, which in effect requires that security
interests similar to the Department's must be filed to be enforceable,
the Third and Seventh Circuits3' maintain that "specialized federal
common law" 32 supplants the Act and immunizes the Department
26 United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1946); Equitable Surety Co. v.
United States ex rel. McMillan & Son, 234 U.S. 448 (1913). State liens are also unenforceable
in this situation. United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274 (1941).
27 The 8% and 66% figures refer only to the 13% of all bankruptcy cases in which
creditors recover anything. In the remaining 87% of the cases, there are either no assets
or only nominal assets. Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HAiv. L. Rav. 1452, 1454
(1964).
28 218 U.S. 452 (1910). In Ansonia, materialmen's liens were rendered unenforceable
because the prime contract, as the Court read it, had passed to the government title to
partially completed ship hulls, presumably the only property available to satisfy the liens.
Id. at 461, 466. Although filing was not discussed in the case, Ansonia has been regularly
cited for the proposition that the Department of Defense need not file its security interest.
See, e.g., In re American Boiler Works, Inc., 220 F.2d 319, 320 (3d Cir. 1955).
Analyzing the parties' contractual intent, the Court concluded that title passed to the
government as a result of their agreement that: "The parts [of the ship] paid for under
the system of partial payments [progress payments] above specified shall become thereby
the sole property of the United States ...." 218 U.S. at 466. In two other contracts the
bankrupt had with the government, however, the progress payments were secured by a
lien, and Ansonia's statutory lien was held to be superior to the government's claim.
Thus, the Court appeared to be saying that by changing the words in the contract from
"lien" to "title," the security interests of private creditors could be rendered unenforceable
in bankruptcy. See id. at 474.
29 E.g., In re American Boiler Works, Inc., 220 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1955); In re Read-
York, Inc., 152 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1945); cf. In re Greenstreet, Inc., 209 F.2d 660 (7th Cir.
1954).
Besides reclaiming property from a bankruptcy trustee, the government may, without
incurring liability, replevy vested property that was sold by a contractor to a good faith
purchaser. Shepard Engineering Co. v. United States, 287 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1961).
30 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)(1) (1964).
31 In re American Boiler Works, Inc., 220 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1955); In re Read-York,
Inc., 152 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1945).
32 This phrase is from an article by Judge Henry J. Friendly in which he states: "[B]y
banishing the spurious uniformity of Swift v. Tyson ... Erie led to the emergence of a
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from filing requirements.33 Presumably, the purpose behind a federal
common law is to provide uniformity to divergent law when such
is necessary for the national interest.34 It is doubtful, however,
that the uniformity that results from exempting the Department of
Defense from varying state filing requirements is necessary for the
national interest, or, indeed, is worth the possibility of leading pro-
spective secured creditors to believe that the collateral is unencum-
bered.
The Department of Defense's ability to reclaim was modified by the
Supreme Court's decision in Armstrong v. United States,35 which held
that when the government acquires its title after another lienholder,
the government's action in reclaiming the property amounts to a taking
in violation of the fifth amendment; therefore, prior lienholders must
be compensated for the value of the interests rendered unenforceable
by the government's action. 36 Before this decision, the government
federal decisional law in areas of national concern that is truly uniform ... [a] specialized
federal common law." Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 405 (1964).
33 The authority relied upon by the circuit courts in their application of federal
common law was very weak. It was a quotation from United States v. Allegheny County,
322 U.S. 174 (1944), to the effect that federal statutes may declare government liens that
need not be filed. In these cases, however, federal contracts rather than federal statutes
were involved. Furthermore, Allegheny's references to federal statutory liens were dicta;
the Supreme Court was concerned with the state of Pennsylvania's attempt to impose a
tax on machinery to which the government held title.
34 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
35 364 U.S. 40 (1959). The prime contractor, Rice Shipbuilding Corp., agreed to
construct Navy personnel boats. Having furnished materials for use in the construction,
Armstrong and others obtained mechanics liens according to the laws of Maine, which
could be enforced by attachment. When Rice became insolvent, it conveyed title to the
hulls and other manufacturing materials to the government in accordance with a default
clause in the contract that allowed the contracting officer to require such a conveyance.
Armstrong's liens were consequently useless since-the government then owning the
property-they could no longer be enforced by attachment.
36 Somewhat unclear, the Court's reasoning seemed to proceed as follows. Under earlier
fifth amendment decisions, the right to resort to specific property for the satisfaction of
one's claim is compensable property. Armstrong's lien was such a right. When it required
the contractor to transfer title, the government totally destroyed the value of the lien
since it could no longer be enforced. Therefore, the government's action was a fifth
amendment taking of property that required just compensation. See 364 U.S. at 48.
Since Armstrong had not been notified by filing of the Department of Defense's security
interest, the Court's holding appropriately required the government to reimburse the
lienholders. On the other hand, the logic supporting this result was weak in two respects.
The opinion failed to mention that the government could have protected its interests by
filing or other notification of prospective creditors. Further, it implied that if private
liens had attached after the Department of Defense obtained title, the latter would not
have had to compensate the lienholders.
Mr. Justic Black also suggested that Ansonia was incorrectly decided, noting that the
"Fifth Amendment question was not raised or passed upon" in the earlier case. 363 U.S.
at 47.
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had used two standard ASPR clauses-the default clause87 and the
termination for the convenience of the government clause 3s -to create
security interests by requiring the contractor to transfer title to all
associated personalty to the government at the time of default or
termination. 9 Since Armstrong, a security interest created by either of
these two clauses will rarely, if ever, financially injure secured creditors
or materialmen since the latter parties normally perfect their interests
prior to default or termination of the contract. The progress payments
clause, however, by vesting title in the government immediately upon
the signing of the contract, continues to create unfiled security interests
superior to the interests of subsequent secured creditors and material-
men.
40
If the private party knew of the government's tide, or should have
known of it, the agency's failure to file the progress payments clause
will not significantly harm him since the purpose of filing is to notify
other creditors of a secured party's claim. In particular, large institu-
tional lenders probably realize that the federal government may not
file all of its security arrangements and are thus wary if they discover
that the prospective debtor has a defense contract. On the other hand,
a lender may not know that a subcontractor 4' is dealing with the fed-
eral government, especially when there are several tiers of subcontract-
ing. Furthermore, small businesses that qualify for the advances42 may
37 32 C.F.R. § 8.707 (1966).
38 32 C.F.R. § 8.701 (1966).
39 See note 30 supra. Armstrong illustrated how these clauses operated. Thus, if a bank
or materialman had a security interest in the contractor's machinery, the government
could terminate the contract, require the contractor to transfer title, and render the private
party's interest unenforceable. See, e.g., Thomson Machine Works Co. v. Lake Tahoe
Marine Supply Co., 135 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
40 E.g., United States v. Ameco Electronic Corp., 224 F. Supp. 783 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
41 Although the text refers primarily to contracts with prime contractors and the
possible injury to their creditors, the same situation is presented when subcontractors
receive progress payments from the Department of Defense through the prime contractor.
If the subcontract contains a clause equally as favorable to the government as the standard
progress payments clause, thus vesting title to the subcontractor's personalty directly in
the government, the latter will advance the subcontractor up to 70% of his total costs.
32 C.F.R. §§ 163.790), 163.82-2 (1966). As with prime contracts, the Department's title is
not filed. The parallel between prime contractors and subcontractors was recently increased
when the Ninth Circuit expanded the scope of federal common law to include government
subcontracts. American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640
(9th Cir. 1961).
42 Although large contractors normally do not receive progress payments on contracts
of less than $1,000,000, the size of the contract is not a factor in awarding progress pay-
ments to small business concerns. Reliable, competent small businesses are customarily
given progress payments if substantial expenditures must be made for at least six months
before any products are completed. Further, small businesses may routinely receive 75%
reimbursement, rather than the usual 70% progress payments. 82 C.F.R. § 163.72 (1966).
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borrow from an equally small, local bank that could not be expected
to be on notice of the possibility of the government's security interest
solely because the firm had a defense contract.43 In either of these cases,
if a lender advanced money after the government contract was signed
and the debtor later became insolvent, the private party's claim would
be subordinated to that of the Defense Department.
While freedom from filing4 may be advantageous in that it relieves
the government of an onerous task, such relief should be balanced
against the resulting disadvantages to private parties that result from
nonfiling. A filing system simultaneously furthers the goals of debtors,
secured parties, and third parties by providing that a perfected interest
is generally superior to unperfected and subsequently perfected ones. 45
Debtors' attempts to borrow money are facilitated since third parties
may, by searching the files, discover many liens that might encumber
the collateral; by filing, secured parties are protected from most unfiled
interests. When a defense contract is involved, however, those who ex-
43 For an example of a relatively small contractor, see Shepard Engineering Co. v.
United States, 287 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1961), where the subcontractor, a good faith purchaser,
bought title vested property from the prime contractor. When the latter became insolvent,
the government reclaimed the property, leaving the subcontractor with only an unsecured
claim against the bankrupt seller. It seems likely that the contractor either did not
realize the significance of the progress payments clause or forgot about it.
44 See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-802. If the government were treated as a pri-
vate party, its title would probably be invalidated in bankruptcy since the security interest
had not been perfected. 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110
(e)(1) (1964); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-301-03. See also UNIFORM COrMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-401(1), dealing with the seller's retention of title to goods in the buyer's possession. See
generally Speidel, Advance Payments in Contracts for Sale of Manufactured Goods: A
Look at the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 281 (1964); Note, Bankruptcy
and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Right to Recover the Goods Upon
Insolvency, 79 HARv. L. REv. 598 (1966).
Prior to the Code, a private buyer, who financed his seller in the manner that the
government finances its contractors, was subject to the doctrine of reputed ownership.
Starting with the Statute of 13 Eliz. 1 c. 5 (1570), and Twynes Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76
Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601), the courts distrusted situations in which a buyer
allowed a seller to retain possession of property to which the buyer had title. Although
many states adopted a "fraud-in-law" doctrine, conclusively holding that transaction void
as against creditors, e.g., Sturtevant & Keep v. Ballard, 9 Johnson 337 (Supp. Ct. Jud. N.Y.
1811), the majority of the states had a rebuttable presumption of fraud. 2 WLLSTON,
SALEs §§ 354-404 (rev. ed. 1948); see, e.g., Southern Cal. Collection Co. v. Napkie, 106 Cal.
App. 2d 565, 235 P.2d 434 (1951); Davis v. Turner, 4 Grattan 422 (Ct. App. Va. 1848).
Although the Uniform Commercial Code continues the doctrine of reputed ownership in
§ 2-402(2) ("A creditor may treat a sale or an identification of goods to a contract for
sale as void if as against him a retention of possession by the seller is fraudulent under
any rule of law of the state . . . .'), it also allows a buyer to perfect a security interest in
the seller's property to secure the former's advances. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 1-201(37), 9-302.
45 This generalization is quite broad. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-301-05,
312.
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tend credit to the contractor may advance money to the contractor on
the basis of an erroneous belief that the latter's collateral is unencum-
bered. Moreover, private parties may not be able to protect their ad-
vances by filing their interests because private liens cannot attach to
government property.46 As a consequence, the contractor may find it
more difficult to obtain credit,47 especially in light of the unfortunate
results caused by the existence of a prior government security interest
-subordination of the private security interest to the Department's
claim.
The disadvantage to the Department of Defense of filing its title
seems to be the effort that would be necessary to locate the public
records and complete the requisite forms. But this task has been con-
siderably simplified by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
in all but three of the states. 48 Even before the Code was so widely
accepted, the Farmers Home Administration and the Small Business
Administration, without apparent difficulty, filed their security inter-
ests49 in compliance with the relevant state statutes.50 Failure by the
Small Business Administration properly to do so has resulted in the
security device being declared invalid in bankruptcy,51 thus subordi-
nating that agency's claim to its usual priority classification as a debt
due the government.
The additional administrative expense that filing would create for
the Department would seem to be insubstantial when compared to the
benefit that private creditors would thereby receive. The virtually
unanimous judgment of the courts and legislatures52 in requiring pri-
46 See note 26 supra.
47 On the other hand, many prospective secured creditors might not know about the
progress payments clause or realize its significance. With such creditors, the contractor
could obtain credit as easily as if there were no federal security interest.
48 1 CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUME § 650 (1966).
49 See, e.g., 6 C.F.R. §§ 307.1(c), 307.2(f)(1) (1966). Compare 13 C.F.R. § 122.7 (1966)
with 12 C.F.R. § 122.17 (Supp. 1966).
50 See, e.g., United States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962);
Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960).
51 Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960); cf. United States v. Brabham,
122 F. Supp. 570 (E.D.S.C. 1954). The opinions give no clue as to why the federal courts
have treated the FHA and SBA differently from the Defense Department. With respect to
the former agencies, both counsel and judges seem to have taken it for granted that they
would comply. Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729, 735-36 & n.13 (9th Cir. 1960). The
primary question the FHA cases dealt with was whether federal or state law should govern
the federal government. While the clrcuits were far from consensus, several held that the
other governmental agencies had to record according to state law. See United States v.
Somerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298
F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Kramel, 284 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956).
52 See note 44 supra.
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vate and public secured parties to shoulder the expense indicates the
relative importance of the interests involved. The Department of De-
fense's exemption from filing requirements is an anomaly that appears
to have no reasonable support.
If the Defense Department were required to file its interest, defense
needs probably would require a change in the usual penalty for failure
to perfect an interest, that is, subordination of the security device.
For example, if a contractor has completed ninety per cent of a
missile system before becoming insolvent, national security require-
ments may dictate that, regardless of failure to file, the Department be
allowed to take possession of the partially completed product so an-
other contractor may rapidly finish construction. To accommodate this
need, the penalty for the Defense Department's failure to file might
be to give it the option to replace the removed property with money
equal to the property's value without setting off its claims against the
contractor.5 3 If the government exercised this option, the money paid
into court would stand in the place of the collateral; whether the
Department would then have the senior or the junior claim to the
money would depend upon the resolution of the priorities question, an
issue that will be discussed subsequently. 54
Although there are several methods by which the Department of
Defense might be required to file its interest, the easiest approach
would be for the agency to amend the ASPR so that the contracting
officer would file the title passing provisions of the contract according
to state law. This could, however, leave private creditors without a
remedy in the event the contract were not filed because administrative
regulations often lack the force of law.55 Therefore, Congress might
53 The Department's need quickly to obtain the partially completed products may
explain why the federal courts consistently exempted the agency from recording require-
ments. The judiciary may have feared that invalidating the Department's interest would
hamper national security efforts because a secured creditor with an invalid security in-
terest, such as the Department, usually only regains possession of the property by waiting
until there is a judicial sale. On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in In re Greenstreet,
Inc., 209 F.2d 660 (1954), allowed the Department of Defense immediately to acquire army
clothing needed for the Korean War without prejudice to the bankruptcy trustee's rights
to sue the government for compensation. Thus, the courts probably could have accom-
modated the need for rapid contract performance and for filing of Department of Defense
security interests within existing precedent.
54 See text following note 70 infra.
55 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 565 (Ct. Cl. 1955). But cf. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S.
245 (1963). See generally Comment, Defense Contractor's Peril: The Written Agreement
May Not Contain All the Terms, 37 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 452 (1964).
Moreover, although the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964), made the
government liable for torts in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
1967]
The University of Chicago Law Review [Vol. 34:661
institute a more comprehensive solution by establishing a national fil-
ing system for government contracts that contain security interests.
Such a system might resemble the arrangements presently in effect
under the Ship Mortgage Act of 192056 and the Civil Aeronautics Act,57
which require security interests in vessels and aircraft to be registered
with federal authorities in order to be perfected. The result of not
filing might again be that the government would be unable to set off
the contractor's debts against its liability to pay for the reclaimed
property, rather than ordinary subordination of the security device.
Another congressional approach could be a statutory requirement
that all contractors post a bond, similar to that required under the
Miller Act,55 for the protection of creditors and purchasers. Histori-
cally, however, Congress has been lenient in exempting contractors
from this requirement, presumably in order to expedite defense pro-
curement.59 Consequently, it seems unlikely that a bond remedy would
be adopted.
If administrative or congressional action were not forthcoming, there
remain two unexplored avenues that might enable a bankruptcy trus-
tee or a secured creditor to persuade a court to subordinate an unfiled
government interest. It is to be expected that the court would then
allow the government to take possession of items essential to the na-
individual under like circumstances, neither agent nor principal are normally liable in
tort merely because the agent violates a duty owed to his principal. Rather, the agent
must violate a duty owed to a third party. Knight v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 73 F.2d 76
(5th Cir. 1934); Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester, 180 Ind. 357, 101 N.E. 915 (1918).
Further, an injured creditor would have to distinguish cases holding that the federal
government is not responsible for the negligence of its agents. Federal Crop. Ins. Corp. v.
Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (mistaken approval by government agent of application for
crop insurance where the crop was not insurable under regulations of the insurance
corporation).
Finally, while the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964), allowed citizens to sue the
government for contractual claims, a creditor could probably not sue as a third party
beneficiary of the prime contract since the ASPR regulation requiring filing would
presumably not be incorporated into the contract.
56 41 Stat. 1000-08 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-61 (1964).
57 Presently the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 772,49 U.S.C. § 1408 (1964).
58 40 U.S.C. §§ 271(a)-(e) (1964). The statute requires those contractors awarded con-
tracts over $2,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or
public work to furnish a performance bond to protect the federal government and a
payment bond to protect all persons supplying labor and materials.
59 The act was amended in 1941, 55 Stat. 147, 40 U.S.C. § 270(e) (1964), to allow the
secretaries of the various services to waive the posting of a bond in supply contracts.
Two other considerations detract from the bond possibility. The contractor's cost of
procuring a bond is reflected in his bid for the contract. Further, since the contractor
does not obtain a bond until he has been awarded the contract, performance may then be
delayed while he attempts to raise the bond.
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tional defense if it agreed to pay for the property without setoff once
the price was determined. 60
First, the bankruptcy trustee might utilize the concepts of the amor-
phous and rapidly developing federal common law.6' The Supreme
Court has held that contracts to which the federal government is a
party, such as those containing progress payments clauses, shall be gov-
erned by federal common law.62 The theory supporting this doctrine is
that there are situations in which an overriding federal interest requires
a nationally uniform rule that supersedes conflicting state law. The fed-
eral courts are free in these situations to fashion rules as they believe
best. When there is no need for such uniformity, but for some reason
the courts have decided that federal common law should still apply,63
the judiciary may adopt state law as the controlling federal law. 64 The
bankruptcy trustee might therefore argue, by analogy to the Farmers
Home Administration and the Small Business Administration, that the
progress payments clause does not require national uniformity.65 If
these agencies have the manpower to comply with state variations in
filing, then the Defense Department should have that ability. Since
there is no need for uniformity, federal common law could adopt state
60 For an example of a court's allowing the agency to obtain possession in this manner,
see In re Greenstreet, Inc., 209 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1954).
01 United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 343 (1966), and Wallis v. Pan American Petro-
leum Corp., 34 U.S.L. WEr.E 4373 (U.S. April 26, 1966), are illustrative of both the am-
biguity and the constant flux that presently characterize the federal common law. See also
Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HAv. L.
REv. 1084 (1964).
62 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (state law on negotiable
instruments inapplicable in determining the liability of the United States on a check
issued by the Treasurer of the United States). The case is commonly cited as originating
the proposition that when the United States is exercising a constitutional function or
power, "in absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion
the governing rule of law according to their own standards. . . . In our choice of the
applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected state law." Id. at 367. See generally
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 383,
410 (1964).
83 If an overriding national interest requires the application of federal common law,
the use of state law as the content of federal common law seems inconsistent. But the
courts have regularly used this rhetoric. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States
318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
64 E.g., DeSylva v. Ballantine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (whether an illegitimate was a
"child" entitled to renewal interests under the Copyright Act decided according to federal
common law incorporation of state law).
O5 The difference between FHA or SBA loans and progress payment advances seems
insignificant. Supporting this view, Consolidated-Hammer Dry Plate & Film Co. v.
Commissioner, 317 F.2d 829, 832 (7th Cir. 1963), held that for income tax purposes the
progress payments clause "is characteristic of the security frequently taken by a creditor,
who makes advances.... [T]his partial payments plan has the attributes of a financing
arrangement." But cf. Boeing Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 342 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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filing statutes as controlling. The Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits"6
have recently provided limited support for the trustee by stating that,
as a matter of federal common law, the FHA and SBA security devices
must conform to state filing statutes. On the other hand, the govern-
ment could attempt to distinguish the FHA and SBA cases on the
theory that the Defense Department's advances were similar to a pur-
chase money security interest and, enlarging the Uniform Commercial
Code's preferential treatment of such interests, should not have to be
filed in order to prevail over competing interests.67
Approaching the problem more directly, a secured party could argue
that the Armstrong decision applies to the government's acquisition of
title under the progress payments clause.6 This position is supported
by interpreting the Court's holding to require that whenever the gov-
ernment's interest is not perfected by filing, so as to notify third parties
of its claim, its reclamation of property is a taking in violation of the
fifth amendment if private security interests are thereby subordinated
to the agency's claim. Also supporting such an approach is Mr. Justice
Black's remark, in Armstrong, that the government should not force
"some people alone to bear the burdens [that is, the costs of shipbuild-
ing] which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole."' ' On the other hand, the Court's concern with the holder
of title at the time that the liens came into existence suggests that the
government might not, by this theory, be forced to compensate the
creditors if the government has title to the property when the private
liens are created.70
II
The Uniform Commercial Code separates contests between compet-
ing security interests into two parts.71 Since perfected interests are prior
C6 United States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755, 759 (4th Cir. 1962) (dicta);
Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960) (although federal law controls the
filing of the SBA's chattel mortgage, the agency must meet state requirements); United
States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577, 580 (8th Cir. 1956) (dicta) (in a suit for tortious conversion
of property, state recording requirements are an applicable part of the ruling federal law).
67 See the discussion of priorities following note 70 infra.
68 The trustee would emphasize that a mortgagee's lien is property that cannot be
taken without just compensation, either by the right of eminent domain, Thibodo
v. United States, 187 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1959), or by legislation weakening the security
device, Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). See also 59
MicH. L. Rlv. 957 (1961); 109 U. PA. L. REv. 275 (1960).
69 564 U.S. 49 (1959).
70 The only two relevant cases decided since Armstrong interpreted the decision in this
way. Shepard Engineering Co. v. United States, 287 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1961); United States
v. Ameco Electronic Corp., 224 F. Supp. 783 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
71 Compare UNmropm COsMMRCIAt CODE § 9-312 with id. §§ 9-302-03.
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to virtually all unperfected ones, 72 the first inquiry is whether the inter-
est has been perfected-for example, by filing. Secondly, the question of
priority among perfected interests is decided, giving consideration to
such factors as the purpose of the loan.73 Although the courts have, as
indicated above, lumped both of these issues together when considering
the progress payments clause, Armstrong and the other relevant cases
may be interpreted as immunizing the Defense Department from the
perfection requirement 74 and the ensuing loss of priority that would
result from failure to perfect. Such judicial amalgamation of the per-
fection and priority issues, however, may lead to priority determina-
tions based only on when the security interest is created, thus obscuring
the possibility that other perfected interests might be given priority
over the Defense Department's claim when factors such as the purpose
of the loan are considered. This section will consider how the courts
might rank the Department's interest if they believed that these added
factors were useful and, by analogy with the Code, addressed themselves
to the priorities question as an issue separate from perfection. The
discussion will first consider how a perfected government interest
would be treated under the Code75 and then propose alterations in
the Code's dispositions a court might make if it were to use the statute
72 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-301(l)-(2).
73 See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-312(3)-(4).
74 Literal application of the Code's rules might require the Department's interest to
be treated as unperfected because the only way for that agency permanently to perfect
its interest under the Code would be by filing a financing statement. See UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 9-802(1). This result appears unlikely, however, because in deciding whether
a security interest is "perfected," a legislature or a court is really determining whether that
interest should be entitled to certain priority results. In considering both private parties'
claims, see note 28 supra, and bankruptcy trustee arguments, see note 15 supra, the federal
courts have clearly decided that the Defense Department's title is entitled to those priority
results associated with a "perfected" interest. See cases cited note 5 supra. In other words,
the Department's claim appears to be perfected by operation of law at the time of contract
signing. If a court were to articulate a reason for so treating the agency's claim, it might
rely on Congress' desire to conserve public funds and the analogy with the purchase
money security interest. See text following note 87 infra.
75 Even though the Uniform Commercial Code establishes an elaborate system of
priorities (see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9, pt. 3, especially § 9-812) that attempts to
settle possible conflicts between interests in negotiable instruments, farm equipment,
assigned contract rights, ordinary goods, and numerous other types of property, the
following discussion and all statements concerning the Code's priorities will assume that
the contractor's collateral is only goods, that is, tangible property such as materials,
inventory, and plans. Further, none of these goods will be treated as covered by docu-
ments of title, negotiable or nonnegotiable instruments, or intangible claims other than
competing security interests. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-804, 308-09. Further-
more, the priorities of competing security interests covering fixtures, accessions, and
conmingled goods are not considered in the discussion. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 9-313-15.
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as a guide in settling priority contests involving Defense Department
contracts.
Rather than discuss the multitude of interests76 that could compete
for the debtor's property, the ensuing discussion will use two hypothet-
ical creditors to illustrate generally the kinds of challenges the govern-
ment might face under the Code. First, a private party could assist in
financing the contract itself. Normally this would not occur since a
contractor receiving the seventy per cent reimbursement provided by
the government would probably not need additional financing; also
such a situation would tend to alert lenders to the government's prior
claim, making them wary of the collateral involved. On the other hand,
the contractor might receive only twenty or thirty per cent reimburse-
ment, or the lender might not realize the contractor had government
assistance. Second, a private party may have advanced money to the
contractor before there ever was a government contract, such loan
being secured by an agreement covering all after acquired property.77
This probably would occur only when the contractor received mate-
rials or inventory financing since secured parties tend to separate long-
term financing covering real property, machinery, and other durable
goods (not typically covered by the progress payments clause) from
short-term financing encompassing items such as accounts receivable
and inventories.78 The significant difference between these two types
of secured creditors is that the second party would not have given new
consideration for the additional collateral-the after acquired prop-
erty. This additional collateral probably augmented previous collateral,
the latter having been the only existing property that the lender origi-
nally subjected to a security interest in order to secure the loan. The
first secured creditor, however, claimed collateral that, existing at the
76 Perfected security interests in the same property may have been created either before
or after the Department advanced progress payments. If before, the competing party's
security arrangement would necessarily contain a clause covering after acquired property.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(3). Further, a private party might have a purchase
money security interest, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-312(3)-(4), or have made fur-
ther advances to the contractor after the security arrangement was completed (so called
future advances). See 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 35.6.7 (1965).
Besides having security interests, the competing parties could be lien creditors, bulk trans-
ferees, buyers not in the ordinary course of business, see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-301(1), buyers in the ordinary course of business, see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-307(1), or materialmen with statutory liens, see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-310.
77 In this case, the private party's original collateral would probably be unrelated to
the government contract. A contest between the Defense Department and the private party
would thus arise only if the after acquired property clause were sufficiently broad to in-
clude the property to which the Defense Department held title.
78 See I GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 8.1 (1965); Cf. 1 COOGAN,
HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.11(3)
(1963).
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time the loan was made, necessarily constituted new consideration for
that loan.
If a court were to abide strictly by all of the Code's provisions,7 9
the Department of Defense's interest could be treated as either a per-
fected security interest ° or a perfected purchase money security inter-
est. If an ordinary perfected interest, the Department's claim would
be subordinate to perfected purchase money security interests and
all security interests perfected before the Department perfected its
interests. Moreover, if the agency were to file its interest, as previously
urged, its claim would still be subordinate to earlier filed interests if
both competing interests were perfected by filing.8 ' Thus, the party
with an after acquired property clause would prevail over the agency,
and whether a private financier of the government contract would
prevail would depend on which party first perfected or filed.
Since simple perfection would not give the government priority
over many competing interests, the Department could be expected to
argue that the progress payments fell within the statute's definition of
a perfected purchase money security interest, thus making its interest
superior to both categories of competing creditors unless one of them
also had a perfected purchase money security interest, in which case the
two would share the collateral according to the extent that their monies
were used to purchase the property.82 But it would be very difficult for
the progress payments to qualify as a purchase money security interest,
that is, an interest securing money advanced for the purpose of and
actually used to enable the contractor to acquire rights in the collat-
eral. 3 As the ASPR clauses are presently drafted, the requisite purpose
would be almost impossible to prove; further, tracing the funds from
70 Several possible competing parties have fairly well defined priorities under the Code.
If a materialman with a statutory lien has possession of the collateral, his claim may be
superior to perfected security interests. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-310. Although
buyers in the ordinary course of business take free of all security interests, see UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307(1), the priority problem remains since the secured parties then
compete for the right to the proceeds from the sale. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306.
A perfected purchase money security interest is usually superior to all competing interests
except the preceding two claims. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-312(3)-(4). As
between two parties with perfected security interests, priority depends on who filed first
if both were perfected by filing, or who first perfected if one interest was perfected by a
method besides filing (for example, by initially taking possession of the collateral). See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-312(5)-(6).
8o Except during the period ,of time it retained possession of the collateral, the Depart-
ment would have to file a financing statement to perfect its interest. See UNIFORM COMt-
mERCIAL CODE § 9-302(1).
81 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312.
82 Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-107 with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 9-312(3)-(4).
83 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-107(b).
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the agency to the purchase of materials, tools, and the like would also
pose a serious obstacle. 4 Thus, even if the government were to file the
necessary financing statement, the progress payments probably would
not qualify as a perfected purchase money security interest.
Within the Code's framework, therefore, the Department of De-
fense's security interest might well be subordinated to one or both
hypothetical private parties even if the agency filed. But a court merely
borrowing from the Code undoubtedly would be free to modify the
statute's provisions where it seemed appropriate. If a court were to
use this freedom, four policy considerations suggest themselves as
relevant to the final decision: (1) the private party's knowledge of the
government's interest, (2) the giving of new consideration for the right
to claim the contested collateral, (3) the ratable sharing of collateral to
which parties have equal claims, and (4) the Department's incentive
to file.
First, a court might question why the Code's section 9-312 priorities
ignore a secured party's knowledge of the competing security interest
since the purpose of a filing system is presumably to notify prospec-
tive creditors and purchasers of the existence of outstanding claims.
If the private party knew of the Department's claim when he gave
value to the contractor, there is no apparent reason why the govern-
ment's claim should not prevail.85 In addition, if the private indi-
vidual reasonably should have known of the progress payments even
though he lacked actual knowledge, such knowledge could be imputed
to the creditor in order to promote diligent investigations.
Second, as noted earlier, the significant distinction between the two
84 See 2 GILmORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 29.2 (1965). Revision of
the progress payments clause, however, could easily incorporate the necessary purpose, and
careful accounting by the contractor might demonstrate that the progress payments were
actually used to buy the collateral. Once the contractor made the initial outlays, entitling
him to reimbursement, the Defense Department's advances would probably cover the cost
of the vast majority of collateral subsequently acquired, especially since the progress pay-
ments are based on "total costs," thus including the expenses of overhead and labor as
well as the cost of materials.
85 Cf. UNIFoRm CommERCIAL CODE § 9-301(1). Compare 2 GiLMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 34.2 (1965) with Braucher, Book Review, 33 U. Cm. L. Rav. 890,
897 (1966). On the other hand, if the private party, although aware of the government's
interest, reasonably believed his claim would be superior to the Department's, then he
should be treated as a party without knowledge. This possibility could occur if the private
party thought the progress payments were unsecured advances.
If the Department knew of the private party's unsecured interest before making the
progress payments, its claim might similarly be subordinated. It seems unlikely, however,
that the government would provide progress payments if there were any significant private
security interests covering the same collateral unless it could obtain a subordination agree-
ment from the private party.
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hypothetical private parties is that one did not give new consideration
for the additional collateral-the after acquired property. Had the
government contract not been consummated, the secured party would
not have had a claim to the contested property since presumably that
property would not have been purchased. In this situation, there seems
to be no injustice in subordinating the private party's interest to the
Department of Defense's claim, especially if the government has paid
seventy per cent of the cost of the added collateral.88
Thus, a court might prefer the Department's interest to those of
competing secured parties if the latter had knowledge of the govern-
ment's claim or if the private creditor did not advance new value in
consideration for the right to claim the contested property as collateral.
But what of an unknowing private party that did give new value,
for example, a creditor who regularly financed the contractor's inven-
tory acquisitions? Both competitors might attempt to justify priority
on the basis of the policy underlying the Code's special treatment
accorded perfected purchase money security interests.87 Although the
policy behind this preferred priority is not clear,8 it may rest on the
86 Not all after acquired property clauses would be subordinate to the government's
claim; for example, if a party advanced new value simultaneously with the contractor's
acquisition of collateral covered by an after acquired property clause-the so-called case of
"future advances"-that party's security interest might be superior to the Department's.
See 2 GILMoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 35.6-.7 (1965).
The unlikely case in which the private party did not provide additional consideration,
but the government did know of the private party's security interest, presents precisely the
kind of situation in which the Code carves out a special priority for purchase money
security interests. Even if all of the Code's requirements were met, however, it appears
preferable to have the government's claim subordinated to that of the private party be-
cause there is no apparent need to facilitate government contracting as there is a possible
need to promote the national movement of goods from producers to users. See note
88 infra.
87 Ignoring the Armstrong rule that the first party to acquire its interest prevails, the
following discussion applies equally to private parties who advanced value before and after
the government acquired its interest.
88 See, e.g., 2 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACrIONS UNDER THE UNIFORTMl
COMMERCIAL CODE § 19.06 (1964), where Professor Hogan suggests that the preferred prior-
ity of the perfected purchase money security interest may be the result of a national con-
cern for facilitating the movement of goods from producers to users. Thus, without the
purchase money security interest priority, lenders would be less inclined to extend credit
for specific purchases when there was a prior perfected security interest; consequently,
some buyers would be unable to acquire the goods they desired. However sound this policy
may be in ordinary business dealings, it does not significantly support the Defense Depart-
ment's claim for priority; government procurement will take place irrespective of the prog-
ress payments' priority classification.
In order for a party to have a perfected purchase money security interest in inventory
under the Code, he must notify prior secured creditors of his claim before the debtor ob-
tains possession of the property. Such actual notification is not required for other purchase
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belief that a competing party's collateral is not substantially impaired
when the purchase money secured party takes his interest,89 either
because the competing party's collateral is rarely used to finance the
particular purchase,90 or because the secured party augments the
debtor's total assets at the same time he acquires the priority.91 While
either or both of these assumptions may generally be true, they do
not necessarily apply to Defense Department progress payments. In
particular, the contractor might use a loan by the competing party
that was not especially earmarked for contract purchases to supply the
thirty per cent of the purchase price that was not advanced by the
Department. 2 In this instance, if the Department's loan were treated
as a purchase money security interest, the competing party's claim
would be junior to that of the government.
When both the government's progress payments and a portion of
the private party's collateral are used to finance the contractor's pur-
chases, there is no apparent reason why either claim should have prior-
ity over the other, unless one adopts a first in time rule, a possibility
that the purchase money security interest priority explicitly rejects.
Therefore, a court might then consider the third policy, namely, that
parties with equal claims to collateral may ratably share the property.
Such a proportional allocation of the collateral could be accom-
plished in either of two ways. The property might be divided accord-
money security interests. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-312(3)-(4). Although the
Code's comments explain this difference on the basis of a greater possibility of fraud with
inventory financing, it would appear that inventories are indistinguishable from other
purchases, except to the extent that inventories are more expensive (if that is true). Thus,
it would seem that both types of purchase should be treated the same, depending upon
the extent to which actual notification is deemed desirable.
89 Professor Gilmore appears to make this assumption in his discussion of purchase
money security interests. See 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 29.2
(1965).
90 If the debtor were to dispose of property subject to the competing party's security
interest, using the proceeds to finance the purchase, the secured party might also have a
security interest in the newly purchased property. See UNIFORM COZIMERCIAL CODE § 9-306.
On the other hand, the later security interest of the private party would not be a purchase
money security interest and would thus be subordinate to a perfected purchase money
security interest in the same property.
91 For example, a private party with a security arrangement covering all of the con-
tractor's property would have the collateral to which he had a superior claim reduced by
a purchase money security arrangement that, while advancing $50 to the contractor, in-
cluded a $100 purchase as collateral for the government's -loan.
92 On the other hand, if the private loan were a purchase money security interest and
the government's advances were also treated as a purchase money security interest, the
two parties would share the collateral under the Code's provisions in proportion to the
extent to which the monies were actually used to purchase the collateral. Compare UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-107 with id. §§ 9-312 (3)-(4).
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ing to the value each creditor contributed to the debtor. Thus, if A
contributed 3 and B contributed 5, A would receive 3/8 and B 5/8
of the value of the property.93 On the other hand, A may have been
more cautious than B in his lending and may have demanded col-
lateral worth 10 for his loan of 3; B may have only had property
worth 8 to secure his loan of 5. In order to reflect such variations in
the parties' willingness to accept risk, A and B might share the prop-
erty in proportion to the value of the collateral securing the loans.
Thus, A would receive 10/18 and B 8/18 of the property; 94 once
either party recovered the full amount of his loan, however, the other
would receive the remainder of the property up to the amount of
his advance.9 5
Although it might appear that either method of ratably dividing
the property would be more equitable than granting one party a
superior claim, a court might prefer the simplicity of the latter ap-
proach over the possible complexities of dividing the collateral, espe-
cially if the court could not choose between the two above methods
of allocation. In that event, it could consider the fourth factor, that
is, the Department's incentive to file a financing statement in the
future. Were its interest superior to the private party's claim, the De-
partment would have no reason to file future progress payments con-
tracts. On the other hand, by subordinating the government's claim
the court would effectively encourage such filing,96 thereby promoting
constructive notification of other parties of the Defense Department's
claim.9 Once private parties had such knowledge, the government's
interest would then prevail, as explained earlier.
If it were to apply these four policy considerations to contests in-
93 See 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 31.5 (1965).
94 In § 9-315, the Uniform Commercial Code establishes a similar method of dividing
the collateral: competing interests share in proportion to the cost of their respective
collaterals. Professor Gilmore criticizes this approach as inequitable, suggesting that the
parties should share according to the value each contributed to the debtor. See 2 GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 31.5 (1965).
95 While it would seem that these two methods of ratably dividing the collateral might
be combined to reflect both the amount of money loaned and the degree of risk assumed, a
suitable compromise is extremely difficult. A nonsense answer results if the ratios between
the values contributed and the values of the collaterals are multiplied, divided, added, or
subtracted.
96 See also UNIFORM COthIERCIAL CODE § 9-312 comment 3, example 1, where the Code
authors suggest that one reason that filing gives a secured party a claim superior to subse-
quent filings, irrespective of the order of advances or knowledge, is "the necessity of
protecting the filing system."
7 On the other hand, one should not be surprised if courts were to rule in favor of the
government. Despite the Department's failure to file, it seems reasonable to assume that
professional financiers are aware of the progress payments security interest or would dis-
cover its existence before making a substantial loan to the contractor.
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volving progress payments, a court might depart from the Uniform
Commercial Code's priority treatment of unperfected security inter-
ests, lien creditors, buyers not in the ordinary course of business,
and bulk transferees. 9s If these creditors failed to provide new con-
sideration for their claim to the collateral, the Department's interest
would be superior. On the other hand, if they lacked knowledge, they
would either ratably share the collateral with the Department, or
they would prevail over the government in order to encourage future
filing.
The application of the foregoing policy considerations to statutory
mechanics liens deserves special mention since many of the cases have
concerned these claims. Although the Code provides that their inter-
ests shall prevail only so long as they have possession of the collateral,99
this requirement might be ignored because the reason for requiring
possession has never been clearly articulated. Furthermore, despite
the Code's contrary implication, the knowledge of the government's
claim by a materialman might subordinate his claim to that of the
Department. Moreover, the rationale for materialmen's priority ap-
pears to be based on the same policy that underlies the purchase
money security interest priority0 ° which, as discussed earlier, leads
to the conclusion that competing parties without knowledge should
share the collateral.
Although the preceding discussion refers generally to the Depart-
ment of Defense's secured claim, it is useful to separate the claim's two
principal components-the demand for repayment of the progress
payments, and the claim for payment of all costs in excess of the con-
tract price that are required for another contractor to complete per-
formance. The latter sum of money represents, essentially, the gov-
ernment's damages caused by the contractor's breach. In contrast to
the claim for repayment of the progress payments, the Department
has not advanced to the contractor, in connection with these damages,
any value that augmented his total assets. There is no apparent reason
why, lacking filing, the government's claim should receive priority
here. If the Department filed, thus bringing the damage claim within
the Code's expansive definition of a security interest, this arrangement
would remain unusual since even when the defaulting party is sol-
vent, damage awards do not always place the other party to the con-
18 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(l).
99 See UNIFORM COMMERIAL CODE § 9-310.
100 That is, since materialmen presumably enhance the value of the property to the ex-
tent of their claim, the original secured creditor has the same amount of collateral after
the materialman is paid as he had before the materialman appeared on the scene.
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tract in the same position he would have occupied if the contract
had been fully performed.' 0 '
When the foregoing discussion of priorities is applied to the Arm-
strong case, the Court's opinion is significant more for its approach
to the problem and the questions it raised than for the answers it
supplied. Mr. Justice Black's approach, reliance on the concept of
"title,"' 02 contrasts rather sharply with the Uniform Commercial
Code's careful separation of the perfection and priorities issues and
its emphasis on clear, "objective" rules that are not as manipulative
as "title." Probably, Mr. Justice Black was influenced by the fact that
the "title" concept easily accomplished the desired result-subordina-
tion of the government's claim-and that all prior cases in the area
have relied on discussions of locations of title to reach their result. 0 3
Read narrowly, the Court's holding was that a defense contract tide
passing provision, without more, was subordinate to a prior statutory
mechanics lien. Beyond this immediate result, however, the implica-
tions of the decision for the kinds of problems discussed here are
particularly cloudy. Probably the mechanics lien is the equivalent
of a perfected security interest, and the Defense Department's title
will be treated as perfected by the operation of law. Thus, Mr. Jus-
tice Black's opinion may have decided that a perfected Department
of Defense interest will not prevail over a prior perfected private
interest. But what about contests between a perfected government
interest and prior unperfected private interest? Moreover, if the De-
partment's interest was not considered perfected after all, would the
101 See generally Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
LJ. 52 (1936).
102 364 U.S. 40, 44, 46 (1959).
103 See cases cited note 5 supra. Although the analysis in the Armstrong opinion failed
to realize that a security interest was involved, such an approach is more understandable
when placed in historical perspective. The "title" analysis in Ansonia was completely in
keeping with the commercial law of that time. The next case to arise, In re Read-York,
Inc., 152 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1945), also preceded widespread use of modern secured trans-
actions analysis; perhaps the Seventh Circuit in Read-York awarded the property to
the government, even though the agency had not filed, because of the urgent need for
defense materials for World War II. The next case, In re Greenstreet, 209 F.2d 660 (7th
Cir. 1954), was also decided by the Seventh Circuit and naturally relied heavily on Read-
York. One year later, when the Third Circuit decided In re American Boiler Works, Inc.,
220 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1955), it apparently relied on Ansonia and the two preceding
Seventh Circuit cases. Thus, by the time the Armstrong Court grappled with the Defense
Department's claim, there was a substantial heritage of "title" analysis that did not use the
more recent terms "perfection" and "priority." Further, neither the brief of the plaintiffs
nor that of the government demonstrated an understanding that the contest with the
materiaman was basically a secured transactions problem.
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government then be able to subordinate the prior private interest by
perfection, perhaps through filing? Further, the Court's holding neces-
sarily fails to determine the priorities of private interests subsequent
to defense contract signing since the plaintiffs in the case were not
such parties. Since the areas the Court did not consider and the
questions it did not answer will probably be left to the lower courts,
it is hoped that these courts will consider the Uniform Commercial
Code's provisions, borrowing from that statute when appropriate. The
only two reported cases since Armstrong, however, indicate that such
may not be the case; 0 4 the simplicity of the first in time rule, it seems,
still has a persuasive appeal.
CONCLUSION
It remains disturbingly unclear why the Supreme Court or the lower
courts have not discussed the possibility of requiring the Defense De-
partment to file its security interests, since local secured parties and
those dealing with subcontractors may not realize that the agency has
a prior enforceable claim. Unlike their treatment of other agencies of
the government and private secured parties, the courts have completely
exempted the Department from filing requirements, justifying this by
applications of federal common law and by focusing on the location of
"title." In order to provide notice to prospective creditors, congres-
sional statutes or altered judicial doctrines could force the Department
either to file its interest or to replace reclaimed collateral with an
equivalent monetary payment. Regardless of whether the agency files,
however, the priorities issue is always present. In contrast to the courts'
single factor approach, a first in time rule, the Uniform Commercial
Code more rationally determines priority questions on the basis of
several relevant considerations. Courts might profitably borrow from
the Code in their treatment of the Defense Department and, while so
borrowing, alter the statute's classification so as to reflect four policy
1 04 In both Shepard Engineering Co. v. United States, 287 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1961), and
United States v. Ameco Electronic Corp., 224 F. Supp. 783 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), the courts held
for the government largely because the Defense Department had "title" to the property,
thus making it impossible for private liens to attach. The concepts of perfection and pri-
ority, and the various issues surrounding each, seemed quite distant. These two cases do
not indicate, however, that Armstrong has had a profound influence on the lower courts;
in the Ameco Electronic case, the court did not even cite Armstrong. Rather, it appears
that the decisions prior to Armstrong continue to mold subsequent lower court decisions
as effectively as they influenced the Armstrong opinion.
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considerations: the knowledge of the competing parties, the giving
of new consideration, the possibilities of ratable sharing of the col-
lateral, and the Department of Defense's incentive to file future secur-
ity interests.
